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Abstract 
Trade data are typically reported at the level of regions or countries and are therefore aggregates across space. In 
this paper, we investigate the sensitivity of standard gravity estimation to spatial aggregation. We build a model 
in which initially symmetric micro regions are combined to form aggregated macro regions. We then apply the 
model to the large literature on border effects in domestic and international trade. Our theory shows that larger 
countries are systematically associated with smaller border effects. The reason is that due to spatial frictions, 
aggregation across space increases the relative cost of trading within borders. The cost of trading across borders 
therefore appears relatively smaller. This mechanism leads to border effect heterogeneity and is independent of 
multilateral resistance effects in general equilibrium. Even if no border frictions exist at the micro level, gravity 
estimation on aggregate data can still produce large border effects. We test our theory on domestic and 
international trade flows at the level of U.S. states. Our results confirm the model's predictions, with 
quantitatively large effects. 
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1 Introduction
By how much do borders impede international trade? It has been a major objective
of research in international trade to identify the frictions that hinder the international
integration of markets, and many policy makers across the globe are keen on reducing
them.
Ever since the seminal paper by McCallum (1995), many researchers have used the
gravity equation as a workhorse model to estimate so-called border e¤ects. In their
simplest form, gravity equations with border dummies are estimated based on aggregate
bilateral trade data. As aggregates, these data combine the trade ows of spatial sub-
units such as boroughs, municipalities and counties into trade ows at a higher level of
spatial aggregation such as regions, states and countries. The question we attempt to
address in this paper is how this process of aggregation a¤ects the estimation of border
e¤ects. How do border e¤ects depend on the spatial units we nd in any given data set?
Put di¤erently, how do border e¤ects depend on the way we slice up the map?
To understand the e¤ects of spatial aggregation, we build a theoretical framework
based on a large number of microregions that trade with each other subject to spatial
frictions. We then aggregate these regions into larger macroregions. Due to the spatial
frictions, the more micro regions we combine, the more we increase the costs of trading
within the newly aggregated regions. As a result, aggregation increases the relative costs
of trading within as opposed to across borders. Our theory shows how this shift in relative
costs leads to heterogeneous border e¤ect estimates: smaller regions are associated with
strong border e¤ects, and larger regions are associated with moderate border e¤ects. We
call this the spatial attenuation e¤ect.
This heterogeneity has important implications for the estimation of border e¤ects as
typically found in the literature. First, since standard border e¤ects are averages of the
underlying individual border e¤ects, we get sample composition e¤ects. That is, samples
that happen to include many large regions (or countries) tend to have moderate border
e¤ects, and vice versa. Second, given that samples inevitably vary across di¤erent studies,
their border e¤ects are not directly comparable to each other since each sample implies
a di¤erent choice about the relevant spatial unit. We show how border e¤ect estimates
can be adjusted so that valid comparisons can be made.
In the empirical part of the paper, we test the predictions of our theory with a data
set of domestic and international trade ows at the level of U.S. states. Our results
conrm the models predictions, in particular the systematic heterogeneity of border
e¤ects across states. For instance, we nd that for a large state like California, removing
the U.S. international border would lead to an increase of bilateral trade on average by
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only 13 percent, whereas for a small state like Wyoming trade would go up over four
times as much (61 percent).
We also carry out a hypothetical scenario of aggregating U.S. states into larger spatial
units, namely the nine Census divisions as dened by the U.S. Census Bureau. Consistent
with our model, we obtain smaller estimated border e¤ects at the level of Census divisions.
Overall, we nd that spatial aggregation has a strong, rst-order quantitative impact on
border e¤ects.
It is important to note that our mechanism of spatial aggregation is separate from
multilateral resistance e¤ects in general equilibrium as highlighted by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003). Since small regions are typically more exposed to international trade,
removing a border tends to have a stronger e¤ect on their price index and hence their
multilateral resistance, compared to large regions. In our model, due to symmetry at the
level of micro regions, every location faces the same price index, and aggregation does
not a¤ect this equilibrium structure. We therefore obtain border e¤ect heterogeneity
without multilateral resistance e¤ects at work. In the data, when we have to keep track
of varying multilateral resistances across space, we nd that the heterogeneity of border
e¤ects stemming from spatial aggregation dominates by a large margin the heterogeneity
coming from multilateral resistance e¤ects.
The fundamental problem with gravity estimation of border e¤ects is that researchers
attempt to identify a border friction that occurs at the micro level faced by individual
economic agents. However, spatial aggregation systematically shifts the estimates that
can be recovered through gravity. Our theory sheds light on the precise nature of this
mismatch between micro frictions and macro data. We show that in fact, even if no
friction exists at the border, standard gravity estimation will still give rise to border
e¤ects, and these can be very large.
Our theory and empirical results on spatial aggregation apply to both branches of the
border e¤ects literature: the international border e¤ect and the domestic border e¤ect.
McCallum (1995) found that Canadian provinces trade up to 22 times more with each
other than with U.S. states. This astounding result has led to a large literature on the
trade impediments associated with international borders. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) famously revisit the U.S.-Canadian border e¤ect with new theory-consistent esti-
mates. Although they are able to reduce the border e¤ect considerably, the international
border remains a large impediment to trade. Havránek and Irová (2015) provide an
overview of this extensive literature.1
1Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report 74 percent as an estimate of representative international
trade costs for industrialized countries (expressed as a tari¤ equivalent). Hillberry (2002) and Chen
(2004) document signicant but varying border e¤ects at the industry level. Anderson and van Wincoop
(2004, section 3.8) provide guidance and intuition for border e¤ects in the case of aggregation across
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A parallel and somewhat smaller literature has explored the existence of border ef-
fects within a country, known as the domestic border e¤ect or intranational home bias.
For example, Wolf (2000) and Millimet and Osang (2007) nd that after controlling for
economic size, distance and a number of additional determinants, trade within individual
U.S. states is signicantly larger than trade between U.S. states. Similarly, Nitsch (2000)
nds that domestic trade within the average European Union country is about ten times
larger than trade with another EU country.
Our approach is inspired by Hillberry and Hummels (2008) who nd that counterfac-
tual ZIP code border e¤ects within the United States would be enormous, by far eclipsing
the magnitude of traditional border e¤ects typically found in the literature. Their re-
sults illustrate an issue known in the geography literature as the Modiable Areal Unit
Problem.2 Briant, Combes, and Lafourcade (2010) systematically highlight this problem
for empirical work in economic geography. Since spatial statistics are ultimately based
on spatial units, empirical results depend on both the size and shape of these units. Our
paper can be seen as an attempt to take the general notion of the Modiable Areal Unit
Problem and apply it to the specic context of gravity estimation of border e¤ects. Our
aim is to obtain precise analytical results for spatial aggregation. In addition, our paper
is also related to the recent literature in international trade that explicitly models internal
trade costs (Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare and Saborío-Rodríguez 2016), or models space
as a continuum (Allen and Arkolakis 2014).
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briey outline the typical estimation
of border e¤ects in the literature. In section 3 we present our formal model of spatial
aggregation for domestic and international border e¤ects. In section 4 we take the theory
to the data and apply it to domestic and international trade ows at the level of U.S.
states. In section 5 we discuss the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of
border e¤ects, in particular the relationship between border frictions at the micro level
and estimation based on aggregate data. Section 6 concludes.
2 Border e¤ects in gravity estimation
The seminal contribution of McCallum (1995) has led to a large number of papers that
estimate border e¤ects based on a gravity framework. For both the theoretical and em-
pirical analysis of border e¤ects in this paper, we follow the canonical structural gravity
industries with industry-specic elasticities of substitution and possibly also industry-specic border
barriers. In this paper, we are concerned with spatial aggregation in the absence of industry variation.
But we share the belief that industry aggregation is an important topic that has not received enough
attention.
2See Fotheringham and Wong (1991).
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model by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). They derive their model from an endow-
ment economy under the Armington assumption of goods di¤erentiated by country of
origin. It is well-known that an isomorphic gravity structure can be derived from di¤er-
ent types of trade models.3
We rst briey review how domestic and international border e¤ects are typically
dened in the literature. We then proceed to the novel part, which is to explain how
spatial aggregation systematically changes border e¤ects.
2.1 The structural gravity framework
We adopt the widely used structural gravity framework by Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). They derive the following gravity equation for the value of exports xij from region
i to region j:
xij =
yiyj
yW

tij
PiPj
1 
; (1)
where yi and yj denote nominal income of regions i and j, and yW denotes world income.
The bilateral trade cost factor is given by tij  1 (one plus the tari¤ equivalent). It is
assumed symmetric for any given pair (i.e., tij = tji). Pi and Pj are the multilateral
resistance terms, which can be interpreted as average trade barriers of regions i and j.
The parameter  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods from di¤erent countries.
There are N regions in the sample.
In the theory and the data, we will deal with three di¤erent tiers of trade ows:
international trade ows that cross an international border, national bilateral trade ows
between di¤erent regions of the same country, and internal trade ows within regions.4
2.2 The trade cost function
We follow McCallum (1995) and other authors by hypothesizing that trade costs tij are
a log-linear function of bilateral geographic distance distij, and an international border
barrier represented by the dummy INTij that takes on the value 1 whenever regions i
and j are located in di¤erent countries, and 0 otherwise. The INTij variable is therefore
an international border dummy. We also include a dummy variable NATij for bilateral
national trade ows that takes on the value 1 whenever regions i and j are in the same
country but distinct (i 6= j), and 0 otherwise. In a sample without international ows, we
3Those include the Ricardian model by Eaton and Kortum (2002) as well as the heterogeneous rms
models by Chaney (2008) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Head and Mayer (2014) discuss these
similarities in more detail.
4Some authors use the expression domestic to describe trade ows within a region. We stick to
internal here.
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therefore refer to the NATij dummy as the national border dummy, or domestic border
dummy, since the case of NATij = 1 implies that a domestic border has been crossed.5
We can express our trade cost function as
ln
 
t1 ij

= INTij + NATij +  ln (distij) ; (2)
where  and  are dummy coe¢ cients, and  is the distance elasticity of trade. We
log-linearize gravity equation (1) and insert the trade cost function (2) to obtain
ln (xij) = ln (yi)+ln (yj) ln
 
yW

+ln
 
P  1i

+ln
 
P  1j

+INTij+NATij+ ln (distij) :
(3)
In typical border e¤ect gravity regressions,  and  are the coe¢ cients of interest. Both
are typically found to be negative, and we will reproduce such standard estimates in the
empirical section 4.
Expression (2) nests the most common trade cost functions in the literature. Wolf
(2000) and Hillberry and Hummels (2003) only consider trade ows within the United
States so that an international border e¤ect cannot be estimated. This corresponds to
 = 0 in trade cost function (2). Conversely, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) follow
McCallums (1995) specication that does not allow for a domestic border e¤ect ( = 0).
3 A theory of spatial aggregation
We now explain formally how border dummy coe¢ cients are a¤ected when regions are
spatially aggregated. We rst turn to the domestic border e¤ect and then to the inter-
national border e¤ect.
3.1 The domestic border e¤ect
Our aim is to formalize the e¤ects of spatial aggregation. Our modeling strategy is to
imagine a world of many microregions as the basic spatial units. We then aggregate
these micro regions into larger macroregions that more closely resemble those we observe
in the data. The motivation is that we can think of large regions as a cluster of many
micro regions combined. For instance, consider California and Vermont. We can imagine
California as a cluster of many micro regions, but in comparison Vermont is a cluster of
only a few micro regions.
5The NATij dummy corresponds to the ownstatedummy in Hillberry and Hummels (2003) and the
homedummy in Nitsch (2000), with the 0 and 1 coding swapped.
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3.1.1 Micro and macro regions
As the basic framework, we model the world as consisting of an arbitrarily large number
of small microregions denoted by the superscript S for small.Each region is endowed
with a di¤erentiated good as in the Armington framework of Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003). To be able to obtain analytical solutions, we impose symmetry across these basic
spatial units. That is, we assume they have the same internal trade costs tSii for all i and
the same bilateral trade costs tSij between each other such that t
S
ij = t
S for all i 6= j. The
bilateral costs are at least as high as the internal costs (tS  tSii  1). The micro regions
have uniform income and multilateral resistance terms ySi and P
S
i .
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As a consequence, the micro regions have the same internal and bilateral trade ows,
xSii and x
S
ij. The same gravity equation as (1) applies at the micro level, i.e.,
xSij =
ySyS
yW
 
tSij
P SP S
!1 
; (4)
where we drop the subscripts for all region-specic variables.
Aggregation
As the next step, we aggregate n  2 micro regions into a macroregion denoted by
the superscript L for large. The income of this aggregated region follows as yL = nyS.
Gravity is imposed to apply again at the macro level. For the internal trade of the macro
region, we have the relationship
xLii =
yLyL
yW

tLii
PLPL
1 
: (5)
This internal macro ow is the aggregate of the n internal ows of the original micro
regions as well as their n(n  1) bilateral ows:
xLii = nx
S
ii + n(n  1)xSij:
Combining the three previous equations we obtain
nySnyS
yW

tLii
PLPL
1 
| {z }
xLii
= n
ySyS
yW

tSii
P SP S
1 
| {z }
xSii
+ n(n  1)y
SyS
yW

tS
P SP S
1 
| {z }
xSij
: (6)
6Implicitly, if R is the number micro regions, then we have a space of dimension R   1. For a more
complicated setting with asymmetric micro regions (characterized by di¤erent sizes and di¤erent trade
costs), we generally have to resort to numerical methods. But qualitatively, the same insights go through
as in the symmetric setting.
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Multilateral resistance is una¤ected by aggregation
In appendix A.1 we show that aggregation does not a¤ect the multilateral resistance
price index, i.e., P S = PL. The intuition is that due to the initial symmetry, aggregation
does not change the underlying trade ow equilibrium and trade cost structure. The
price index therefore preserves the incidence interpretation of carrying goods to and from
the same hypothetical world market as in Anderson and Yotov (2010).
Aggregate internal and bilateral trade costs
Given that the price indices are the same across micro and macro regions, equation
(6) simplies to  
tLii
1 
=
1
n
 
tSii
1 
+
n  1
n
 
tS
1 
: (7)
If the economy faces higher bilateral than internal costs at the micro level (tS > tSii), then
internal trade costs at the macro level grow in the number of aggregated micro regions
(@tLii=@n > 0).
7 The only exception is the limiting case of no spatial frictions in the sense
of tS = tSii. In that case, internal trade costs at the macro level are the same as at the
micro level (tLii = t
S
ii). Thus, the frictionless world is the only case where aggregation is
irrelevant since border e¤ects are then by construction zero.8
In contrast to internal trade costs, bilateral trade costs are not a¤ected by aggregation
and remain the same for micro and macro regions. Suppose we observe two macro regions
of di¤erent size, one comprising n1 micro regions and the other n2. Gravity commands
the bilateral trade relationship
xLn1;n2 =
yLn1y
L
n2
yW
 
tLn1;n2
PLPL
!1 
; (8)
where xLn1;n2 denotes the trade ow from the rst to the second region with bilateral costs
tLn1;n2 , and y
L
n1
and yLn2 are their respective incomes. This ow is the aggregate of n1n2
bilateral micro ows:
xLn1;n2 = n1n2x
S
ij:
We can therefore write
n1y
Sn2y
S
yW
 
tLn1;n2
PLPL
!1 
| {z }
xLn1;n2
= n1n2
ySyS
yW

tS
P SP S
1 
| {z }
xSij
: (9)
7See Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare and Saborío-Rodríguez (2016, equation 11) for a similar derivation
based on the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model for the special case of tSii = 1.
8The frictionless world would correspond to tSij = t
S = 1 for all i; j. But we could normalize trade costs
to any other positive uniform level since this would lead to the same trade ows in general equilibrium.
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Given P S = PL, it follows
tLn1;n2 = t
S (10)
such that bilateral trade costs between any two regions are the same regardless of the
degree of aggregation. Thus, while the bilateral friction tS is specied at the lowest level
of spatial aggregation (i.e., at the level of micro regions), no additional friction appears
by crossing the border from one macro region and another.
3.1.2 Estimating the traditional border e¤ect
Having characterized the full set of aggregate internal and bilateral trade costs for macro
regions in equations (7) and (10), we now formally derive the estimated border e¤ect
coe¢ cient. That is, if the above model is true but we use standard gravity estimation in
combination with the traditional trade cost function, what result do we get?
To keep the exposition as clear as possible, we use a simplied version of the traditional
trade cost function (2) that only consists of the dummy variable for bilateral national
trade ows NATij:
ln
 
t1 ij

= NATij; (11)
where we revert to the standard notation with i denoting an exporting region and j
denoting an importing region. We deliberately ignore other trade cost components.9 The
simplied trade cost function (11) implies that internal trade costs within regions are
zero with NATii = 0 and hence tii = 1. Most important for our purposes, this condition
holds for all regions i. The trade cost function (11) therefore imposes a one-size-ts-all
restriction on internal trade costs. It goes beyond a normalization whereby internal trade
costs are set to a particular value for one region.
We use the log-linearized form of gravity equation (1)
ln

xij
yiyj

= c+ (1  ) ln (tij)
= c+ NATij;
where we take the income terms onto the left-hand side. Since the multilateral resistance
terms do not vary across regions, they are absorbed by the constant c =   ln  yW  +
ln
 
P  1i

+ ln
 
P  1j

. This simple regression model with a constant and single explana-
9In appendix A.5 we show that our results go through for a more conventional specication that
includes bilateral distance as an additional trade cost component.
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tory variable leads to the OLS estimate
b = Cov

ln

xij
yiyj

; NATij

Var (NATij)
: (12)
As shown in appendix A.2, we can derive the coe¢ cient estimate as
b =  + ln NY
i=1
 
t 1ii
 1
N
!
| {z }
bias
: (13)
We therefore obtain a biased estimate. The bias is the logarithm of the geometric average
of internal trade cost factors scaled by the elasticity of substitution. To be more specic,
given that  is typically negative and given that internal trade costs are typically positive
in the data (i.e., tii > 1), we have an upward bias: the larger internal trade costs are in
the sample, the closer the  estimate will be pushed towards zero.
Once we acknowledge positive internal trade frictions, we need to adjust our interpre-
tation of border coe¢ cients estimated with the traditional dummy variable. We highlight
three important implications that follow from the result in (13) and that we will explore
in the empirical section:
1. Interpretation relative to a zero-internal-frictions benchmark: As the one
exception, the bias would disappear only if internal trade costs were on average
zero.10 For the interpretation of trade cost function (11) we therefore have to
adopt the implicit normalization of zero average internal trade costs.11 The correct
interpretation based on the traditional trade cost function would be: All else being
equal, trade ows across national borders are estimated to be only the fraction
exp() of internal trade ows under the assumption that internal trade costs are
zero on average.
2. No direct comparability across samples: Border e¤ect coe¢ cients are gener-
ally not directly comparable across di¤erent samples because of the heterogeneity
of internal trade costs. For example, suppose we obtain a coe¢ cient of 1 =  1 in
one sample and a coe¢ cient of 2 =  0:5 in another, and the two coe¢ cients are
signicantly di¤erent. This di¤erence does not necessarily imply that the domestic
border is more detrimental to trade ows in the rst sample than in the second.
10Formally, only if
YN
i=1
t
1=N
ii = 1:
11If other controls such as distance are added to the trade cost function, the bias generally does not
disappear (see appendix A.5).
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3. Systematic sample composition e¤ects: Related to the second implication,
border e¤ect coe¢ cients are sensitive to sample composition in a systematic way.
More specically, adding regions to the sample with relatively large internal trade
costs pushes the border coe¢ cient towards zero. Vice versa, adding countries with
relatively small internal trade costs renders the border coe¢ cient more negative. In
the empirical section we show that these sample composition e¤ects are substantial
from a quantitative point of view.
3.1.3 A heterogeneous trade cost function
Once we aggregate across space as implied by equation (7), internal trade costs become
heterogeneous across regions with tii 6= tjj for all i 6= j in general. The one-size-ts-all
restriction implicit in the simple NATij dummy then renders trade cost function (11)
misspecied. As shown by equation (13) and in appendix A.4, this tension generates an
omitted variable bias in standard gravity estimation of border e¤ects. Trade cost function
(11) with a simple dummy is therefore unsuitable for spatial aggregation as it does not
accommodate the heterogeneous nature of internal trade costs.
This problem can be addressed by augmenting the function with an interaction term
to obtain a heterogeneous trade cost function:
ln
 
t1 ij

= NATij +  (1 NATij) ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2 (14)
with  = 1. The trade cost function (14) reduces to equation (11) for i 6= j. But unlike
(11), it allows for heterogeneous internal trade costs in the case of i = j. It nests the
simple trade cost function (11) for  = 0. This parameter restriction on  comes down
to a straightforward testable hypothesis of border e¤ect heterogeneity that we consider
in the empirical section.
If the heterogeneous trade cost function (14) is used in a gravity equation such as (1),
then the border e¤ect (dened here as the trade-impeding e¤ect of the border on bilateral
trade, ignoring the general equilibrium multilateral resistance e¤ects) is given by
d ln (xij)
dNATij
=  +  ln
 
t 1ii t
 1
jj
 1
2 : (15)
As we show in appendix A.3, this border e¤ect is invariant to the specic normalization
chosen for trade costs.12 That is, suppose we renormalize trade costs by setting tkl = 1
for trade costs between regions k and l. The border e¤ect (15) remains unchanged.
12In the Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model, trade ows are homogeneous of degree zero in trade
costs tij for all i; j (including internal trade costs). Therefore, trade costs can be arbitrarily normalized.
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The key insight is that all else equal, larger internal trade costs lead to a smaller
border e¤ect. That is, the second term  ln
 
t 1ii t
 1
jj
1=2
increases in tii and tjj and thus
counteracts the negative e¤ect stemming from  < 0.13 Ceteris paribus border e¤ects are
therefore mechanically driven by internal trade costs and inherently heterogeneous, in
contrast to the traditional trade cost function (11). We call this the spatial attenuation
e¤ect. In the empirical part of the paper, we illustrate the heterogeneity by reporting the
full range of border e¤ects.
The intuition is that due to aggregation, larger regions have larger internal trade
frictions. This increases internal resistance, leading to relatively less internal trade and
relatively more bilateral trade. As a result, the domestic border e¤ect appears smaller.
In section 4.7 we show that this mechanism is entirely separate from general equilibrium
multilateral resistance e¤ects as highlighted by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
3.1.4 Estimating heterogeneous domestic border e¤ects
The right-hand side variables of the heterogeneous trade cost function (14) do not only
include the national border dummy NATij but also the internal trade costs of the two
regions in each pair, tii and tjj. Internal trade costs are typically not directly observable,
but this does not pose a problem since we can use appropriate xed e¤ects to control for
them.14
More specically, we can break down trade cost function (14) into region-specic terms
as
ln
 
t1 ij

= NATij  
n
 NATij ln
 
t1 ii
 1
2 +  NATij ln
 
t1 jj
 1
2
o
| {z }
k
2
NATijk =
k
2
NATkij
+ ln
 
t1 ii
 1
2| {z }
i
+ ln
 
t1 jj
 1
2| {z }
j
:
(16)
In a standard log-linearized regression based on gravity equation (1), the last two terms
would be absorbed by exporter and importer xed e¤ects i and j that also capture
income and multilateral resistance terms. At rst glance it would seem that the terms in
curly brackets could be estimated by interacting the national border dummy NATij with
i and j. However, this would lead to perfect collinearity with the last two terms, i
and j.15 Instead, the rst three terms can be estimated through an interaction of the
13Note that    1 > 0. For su¢ ciently large tii and tjj the border e¤ect can even become positive in
total. See the empirical section for examples.
14An alternative would be to use internal distance as a proxy for internal trade costs. But we prefer the
xed e¤ects approach due to its simplicity and because it is not clear how to measure internal distances
(see Head and Mayer 2009).
15The collinearity would arise because adding up the two interaction e¤ects with the exporter and
importer xed e¤ects would yield twice the constant term. That is, NATiji +NATijj + i + j = 2
for each observation.
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NATij dummy with region xed e¤ects k that equal unity whenever k is an exporter
(k = i) or an importer (k = j) with k = 1; :::; N . This is equivalent to region-specic
NAT kij dummies with coe¢ cients k.
16 A simple test of border e¤ect heterogeneity comes
down to the hypothesis that the k coe¢ cients di¤er from each other. We note that the
common  coe¢ cient in (16) cannot be identied since it would be collinear with the
ks.
3.2 The international border e¤ect
We proceed in two steps. First, we model trade ows at the level of small geographical
units, which we call microregions, based on a standard gravity setting. Second, as in
the model for the domestic border e¤ect, we aggregate these micro regions into larger
macroregions. We assume that a gravity setting also holds at the macro level, and we
map the trade ows and trade costs of the micro regions onto the larger spatial units of
macro regions. Our purpose is to explore the implications of this aggregation for gravity
estimates of the international border e¤ect.
The global economy consists of two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. We rst
describe the trade ows within one country and then across countries.
3.2.1 Micro and macro regions on a circle
As in section 3.1 the world is based on symmetric micro regions denoted by superscript
S. Each region is endowed with a di¤erentiated good and has uniform income and
multilateral resistance terms ySi and P
S
i . Gravity equation (4) holds at the micro level.
As will become apparent shortly, to deal with the international border e¤ect it is no
longer su¢ cient to just have a binary di¤erence between domestic trade costs tSii and
bilateral trade costs tS at the micro level as in section 3.1. Instead, we need to introduce
a spatial topography such that frictions increase between more distant micro regions.
At the same time, we would like to preserve symmetry to be able to obtain analytical
solutions.
Therefore, as the simplest case of such a topography, we model the domestic economy
as a circle. Micro regions are symmetric segments of the circle, each surrounded by two
neighbors. Bilateral trade costs tSh are equal to 
h, where   1 represents a spatial dis-
tance friction with h  1 denoting the number of stepsbetween micro regions. Adjacent
regions are one step apart with h = 1, and so on. Thus, bilateral trade costs between
16Since the region-specic dummies capture every national trade ow twice (once on the exporter side
and once on the importer side), the k coe¢ cients must be divided by 2 to obtain estimates that are
comparable to the standard border coe¢ cient.
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micro regions increase in distance as long as  > 1. Internal trade costs within a micro
region are lower than or equal to bilateral costs, i.e., tSii  tSh for any h.17
Aggregate bilateral trade costs
We aggregate n  2 micro regions into a macro region denoted by superscript L
with income yL = nyS, and we impose gravity at the macro level. The aggregated micro
regions are adjacent on the circle such that the macro region has no holes.Here we focus
on bilateral trade between macro regions both within and across borders. Those are the
relevant ows for the international border e¤ect. But for completeness, in appendix B.1
we also derive the internal trade ows of an aggregated macro region and the associated
internal trade costs.
In contrast to the domestic border setting in section 3.1, bilateral trade costs at
the macro level are sensitive to aggregation. Suppose we observe two macro regions of
di¤erent size, one comprising n1 micro regions and the other n2. Gravity commands the
bilateral trade relationship (8). The bilateral macro ow from the rst to the second
region is the aggregate of n1n2 bilateral micro ows:
xLn1;n2;h =
n1X
v=1
n2X
w=1
xSh+v+w 2;
where the subscript h in xLn1;n2;h indicates the number of steps that the two macro regions
are apart. For instance, xLn1;n2;1 for h = 1 means that the two macro regions are adjacent
(i.e., one step apart), and xLn1;n2;2 for h = 2 means the two macro regions are two steps
apart etc. This means we have to add the micro ows xSh+v+w 2 with step length h+ v+
w   2, summed over v and w, to yield the bilateral macro ow.
As in the model for the domestic border e¤ect, it turns out that aggregation does not
change the multilateral resistance price indices, i.e., P S = PL. In appendix B.2, we show
this result formally. The intuition is that aggregation does not a¤ect the underlying trade
cost structure and equilibrium of trade ows.
Using a relationship as in equation (9) and given that multilateral resistances are the
same across micro and macro regions, we can derive the expression for bilateral trade
costs at the macro level as
 
tLn1;n2;h
1 
=
1
n1n2
n1X
v=1
n2X
w=1
 
tSh+v+w 2
1 
: (17)
17The theory for the domestic border e¤ect in section 3.1 can be seen as a one-country special case. The
simple binary di¤erence between bilateral and domestic trade costs at the micro level can be achieved by
setting  = 1 such that all bilateral trade costs become unity (tSh = t
S = 1) and by normalizing domestic
trade costs to a smaller value tSii < 1.
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A key result is that these bilateral macro trade costs rise in the number of aggregated
micro regions, i.e., @tLn1;n2;h=@n1 > 0 and @t
L
n1;n2;h
=@n2 > 0. That is, all else equal, larger
regions tend to have larger trade costs with other regions in that country. The only
exception would be the special case of no spatial gradient when bilateral trade costs
between micro regions are the same regardless of distance, i.e., when  = 1 such that
tSh = t
S for all h. In that case, bilateral trade costs would be the same at the micro and
macro levels as in equation (10).
To see more clearly how bilateral trade costs depend on region size n1 and n2, we
substitute the spatial friction tSh+v+w 2 = 
h+v+w 2.18 We can then decompose bilateral
trade costs at the macro level into three elements as
tLn1;n2;h = 
h|{z}
bilateral distance
 
1
n1
n1X
v=1
 
v 1
1 ! 11 
| {z }
n1
 
1
n2
n2X
w=1
 
w 1
1 ! 11 
| {z }
n2
: (18)
The rst element h denotes the bilateral distance between the two macro regions. The
remaining elements n1 and n2 are region-specic, and more importantly they rise in
the sizes n1 and n2 of the macro regions.19 These terms can be interpreted as the costs
of reaching the domestic borders of macro regions. For instance, suppose the rst macro
region consists of only one micro region (n1 = 1). It follows n1 = 1, meaning that
no distance has to be incurred to reach the domestic border. But for a macro region
consisting of several micro regions (n1 > 1), we get n1 > 1 as long as  > 1 because of
the rising average internal distances of individual micro regions to the domestic border.
In summary, bilateral trade costs at the macro level increase in the size of the underly-
ing regions because more spatial frictions within the macro regions have to be overcome.
Only in the limiting case where the macro regions are micro regions (n1 = n2 = 1) does
the bilateral distance h fully represent the bilateral trade costs.
International trade costs
Both countries have the same internal structure of micro regions, and we therefore have
two circles. We assume that bilateral international trade costs between micro regions tSint
consist of a common international distance int. The common distance can be motivated
by a central port for international trade in each country. Then for each micro region
the distance to the port is the same.20 In addition, we assume a cost for crossing the
18We assume that the two macro regions are in the same semi-circle so that the shortest direction of
trade is always either clockwise or counterclockwise. If the two regions straddled di¤erent semi-circles,
the same argument would go through qualitatively but the resulting expression for tLn1;n2;h would be
more complicated.
19Formally, @n1=@n1 > 0 and @n2=@n2 > 0.
20As a generalization, we could allow for bilateral distance gradients between micro regions at the
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international border so that we can write
tSint = int exp


1  

; (19)
where   0 captures the international border barrier. This structure translates into the
same level of international trade costs at the aggregate level between two macro regions
of size n1 and n2, i.e., tSint = t
L
n1;n2;int
. The intuition is that identical trade costs are
aggregated such that the appropriate theoretical average is the same. This stands in
contrast to aggregate bilateral trade costs within countries as in equation (18) that do
vary by region size.
We should briey comment on a possible generalization. As an alternative modeling
strategy, instead of just two circles representing two countries we could assume multiple
circles representing multiple countries. To preserve symmetry we could have a pearl
necklaceof countries where each pearl represents a circular economy. That is, we could
arrange countries in a circular fashion similar to the way micro regions are arranged
within countries. International distances would then vary by country pair in contrast to
our simple common distance int. However, this expanded model would not yield any
qualitatively new insights. We therefore work with the simpler two-country setting.
The trade cost function
Comparing expressions (18) and (19) for bilateral trade costs at the national and
international levels, we can see that region-specic terms only appear for national trade
costs. In logarithmic form and scaled by the elasticity of substitution, we can therefore
write the overall trade cost function that arises from our model as
ln
 
t1 ij

= ln
 
1 ij

+ INTij + (1  INTij)

ln(1 i ) + ln(
1 
j )
	
; (20)
where i denotes an exporter and j is an importer. If ij is a domestic pair, then ij equals
h, and int otherwise.
3.2.2 Heterogeneous international border e¤ects
The key feature of trade cost function (20) is the interaction term between the interna-
tional border dummy and the region-specic terms ln(1 i ) and ln(
1 
j ). This interac-
tion is absent in standard trade cost functions such as (2). It implies that in a gravity
equation such as (1), the impact of the border on bilateral trade becomes heterogeneous.
international level. The relevant case would be a friction parameter that di¤ers from the corresponding
parameter  for domestic ows.
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More specically, the direct e¤ect of INTij on bilateral trade follows as
d ln (xij)
d INTij
=  +

ln( 1i ) + ln(
 1
j )
	
; (21)
where for the moment we ignore the general equilibrium multilateral resistance e¤ects
operating through the price indices.
The literature typically nds a negative and signicant border dummy coe¢ cient .
In the limiting case when regions i and j are micro regions with no aggregated spatial
frictions, we have i = j = 1 and the second term disappears. This would also happen
if the domestic economies were frictionless in the sense of  = 1. But in the more
realistic case when i and j are aggregates and spatial frictions are present, the second
term becomes positive and counteracts the negative e¤ect stemming from .21 Thus,
larger regions have weaker (i.e., less negative) border e¤ects. We call this the spatial
attenuation e¤ect.
We note that this form of heterogeneity operates independently and in addition to
heterogeneity induced by multilateral resistance e¤ects. We discuss general equilibrium
e¤ects in more detail in section 4.7.
Ceteris paribus the e¤ect of an international border dummy is therefore driven by the
internal resistanceof the regions in question, inducing systematic heterogeneity. In the
empirical part of the paper, we illustrate the heterogeneity by reporting the full range of
border e¤ects. We nd that the heterogeneity is quantitatively substantial.
Estimating heterogeneous international border e¤ects
Estimation of trade cost function (20) is straightforward. Due to symmetry, the i
and j terms are region-specic, not exporter- and importer-specic. We can therefore
capture them with region xed e¤ects k that equal unity whenever i = k or j = k
regardless of the direction of trade.22 As the empirical specication we obtain
ln
 
t1 ij

= INTij
 
 +

ln( 1i ) + ln(
 1
j )
	| {z }
kINTijk
+ ln
 
1 ij
  ln( 1i ) + ln( 1j )| {z }
k
; (22)
where k indicates region-specic international border coe¢ cients. A simple test of border
e¤ect heterogeneity comes down to the hypothesis that the k coe¢ cients di¤er from each
other. We note that the  parameter cannot be identied due to collinearity with the
xed e¤ects.
21In appendix B.3 we show that only if the i and j terms are unity can we obtain an unbiased
estimate of  in a gravity regression with a standard international border e¤ect.
22We do not use internal trade ows in the estimation where i = j.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Data
Our two main data sources are the Commodity Flow Survey and the Origin of Movement
series provided by the U.S. Census Bureau. To obtain results that are comparable to
the literature, we use the same data sets as Wolf (2000) and Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) for domestic trade ows within the United States, based on the Commodity Flow
Survey. The novelty of our approach is to combine these domestic trade ows with inter-
national trade ows from individual U.S. states to the 50 largest U.S. export destinations,
based on the Origin of Movement series. Thus, our data set comprises, for instance, trade
ows within Minnesota, exports from Minnesota to Texas as well as exports from Min-
nesota to France. We also employ trade data between foreign countries in our sample. In
appendix C we describe our sources in detail.
We form a balanced sample over the years 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2007. We drop Alaska,
Hawaii and Washington, D.C. due to data quality concerns raised in the Commodity
Flow Survey so that we are left with the 48 contiguous states. This yields 1,726 trade
observations per cross-section within the U.S., including 48 intra-state observations and
1,678 state-to-state observations per cross-section.23 The observations that involve the 50
foreign countries are made up of 2,338 export ows from U.S. states to foreign countries
as well as 2,233 exports ows amongst foreign countries per cross-section.24
4.2 Overview
We rst show in section 4.3 that our data exhibit a substantial domestic border e¤ect, as
established by Wolf (2000). We also show that the data exhibit a signicant international
border e¤ect, as established by McCallum (1995). In a second step in section 4.4, we
move away from border e¤ects that are common across states, as typically imposed in
the literature. Instead, we estimate individual border e¤ects that are allowed to vary
across states, thus uncovering a large degree of underlying heterogeneity. In section 4.5,
we systematically alter our estimation sample to understand how sample composition
23The maximum possible number of U.S. observations would be 4848 = 2; 304 per cross-section. The
missing observations are due to the fact that a number of Commodity Flow Survey estimates did not
meet publication standards because of high sampling variability or poor response quality. To generate a
balanced sample, we drop pairs if at least one year is missing.
24Our entire sample thus comprises 6; 297 observations per cross-section, or 25; 188 in total. The
maximum possible number of international exports from U.S. states would be 4850 = 2; 400 per year.
We have 62 missing observations mainly because exports to Malaysia were generally not reported in
1993. Only 18 of these observations not included in our sample are most likely zeros (as opposed to
missing). The maximum possible number of exports between foreign countries would be 4950 = 2; 450
per cross-section. To generate a balanced sample, we drop pairs if least one year is missing.
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e¤ects change border e¤ect estimates. In section 4.6, we aggregate the 48 U.S. states
into larger spatial units. Finally, we show in section 4.7 that quantitatively, border e¤ect
heterogeneity is substantially more important than heterogeneity induced by multilateral
resistance e¤ects.
4.3 Estimating common border e¤ects
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, we replicate well-known results on the domestic border
e¤ect, estimated with a national border dummy. We only use trade ows within the U.S.
International trade ows are not included. As our estimating equation we use the log-
linear version of gravity equation (1). As typical in the literature (for instance Hillberry
and Hummels 2003), we use exporter and importer xed e¤ects to control for multilateral
resistance and all other country-specic variables such as income. As in Wolf (2000), in
column 1 we only use data for 1993. In column 2 we add the data for 1997, 2002 and
2007. Our estimate of b =  1:48 in column 2 is the same as Wolfs baseline coe¢ cient.25
The interpretation of our coe¢ cient is that given distance and economic size, trade be-
tween U.S. states is 77 percent lower compared to trade within U.S. states (exp( 1:48) =
0:23). Assuming a value for the elasticity of substitution of  = 5, we can translate this
into a tari¤ equivalent of the national border of 45 percent.26 As we show in section 3.1.2,
this interpretation would only be valid under the assumption that domestic trade costs
within U.S. states were zero on average. For positive domestic trade costs (which is the
realistic scenario), according to expression (13) the underlying tari¤ equivalent is even
higher. Put di¤erently, the b estimate only captures the national border barrier net of
internal trade costs.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 we replicate standard results for the international border
e¤ect. As is customary, we do not include trade ows within U.S. states, and the national
border dummy is dropped as a regressor. To be able to identify the international border
dummy coe¢ cient we follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and others by using state
and country xed e¤ects instead of exporter and importer xed e¤ects. As the output
regressors are collinear with these xed e¤ects, they are dropped from the estimation.
In column 3 we estimate an international border coe¢ cient of b =  1:25 for the year
1993, implying that after we control for distance and economic size, exports from U.S.
25Wolfs coe¢ cient has a positive sign because his domestic border dummy is coded in the opposite
way. Hillberry and Hummels (2003) reduce the magnitude of the national border coe¢ cient by about a
third when excluding wholesale shipments from the Commodity Flow Survey data. The reason is that
wholesale shipments are predominantly local so that their removal disproportionately reduces the extent
of intra-state trade. However, Nitsch (2000) reports higher coe¢ cients in the range of  1:8 to  2:9 by
comparing trade within European Union countries to trade between EU countries.
26For ln
 
t1 ij

=  1:48, it follows tij = 1:45. This is a partial equilibrium calculation in the sense
that we ignore price index e¤ects for simplicity. For general equilibrium e¤ects, see section 4.7.
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states to foreign countries are about 71 percent lower than trade between U.S. states
(exp( 1:25) = 0:29). The corresponding tari¤ equivalent is 37 percent. When we pool
the data over the years 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2007 in column 4, we obtain a similar
coe¢ cient of  1:21. These estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute magnitude but
nevertheless roughly fall in the same ballpark range as the estimates of around  1:6
reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, Table 2) in their sample involving trade
ows of U.S. states and Canadian provinces.
Overall, we have replicated national and international border coe¢ cient estimates
as typically found in the literature. In fact, our national point estimate exceeds the
international point estimate in absolute magnitude, a nding which is consistent with
Fally, Paillacar and Terra (2010) in their study of Brazilian trade data as well as Coughlin
and Novy (2013).
4.4 Estimating individual border e¤ects
We run the same regression specications with panel data as in columns 2 and 4 of Table
1, but now allowing the domestic and international border coe¢ cients to vary across
states. That is, we estimate individual, state-specic border e¤ects. This approach is
consistent with the theory in sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.2, respectively. Expressions (15) and
(21) predict that for larger states, the border coe¢ cients should be closer to zero due to
spatial attenuation.
4.4.1 Individual domestic border e¤ects
We rst estimate national border dummy coe¢ cients for the 48 U.S. states in our sample.
We obtain the corresponding k coe¢ cients by using trade cost function (16) in otherwise
standard gravity estimation. As equation (15) shows, theory predicts that for a given U.S.
state, all else being equal we should expect a smaller trade e¤ect of the national border
dummy in absolute magnitude (i.e., less negative) if the state has larger (logarithmic)
internal trade costs.
How can we obtain a measure of internal trade costs that is consistent with the theory?
Equation (7) describes how tLii depends on the number of aggregated micro regions n and
the micro frictions tSii and t
S. But since these micro frictions are unobservable, instead
we resort to gravity equation (5) to obtain a theory-consistent measure of internal trade
costs. Given that multilateral resistance terms are the same across macro regions, it
follows that
 
tLii
 1
is proportional to the ratio yLyL=xLii. We therefore proxy ln (tii) with
ln
 
yLyL=xLii

.
As an illustration, in Figure 1 we plot the national border coe¢ cients k against our
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proxy of internal trade costs. Two main observations can be made. First, there is a
large degree of heterogeneity across the estimates. While the mean of the coe¢ cients is
 1:32 and thus close to the point estimates reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1, the
individual border coe¢ cients span a range of more than six log points. They are tightly
estimated, with standard errors of 0:13 on average (not plotted in the gure).
Second, as predicted by our theory, the individual coe¢ cients are positively related
to internal trade costs. Given a correlation of 0.92 between internal trade costs and
state GDP, this means the coe¢ cients are also positively related to the economic size
of states. That is, the smaller the state, the more detrimental the e¤ect of crossing a
national border appears to be. For example, the ve states with the smallest state GDPs
(Wyoming, Vermont, North Dakota, Montana, South Dakota) have border coe¢ cients
in the vicinity of  4. The back-of-the-envelope interpretation would be that for those
states, crossing a border with another state reduces trade by 98 percent.27 At the other
extreme, a few economically large states such as New Jersey and California are associated
with positive border coe¢ cients.28 These results are clearly implausible. They underline
the nature of the domestic border e¤ect as a statistical artefact.
4.4.2 Individual international border e¤ects
We also estimate individual coe¢ cients for the international border dummies. We obtain
these k estimates by using trade cost function (22) in otherwise standard gravity esti-
mation, substituting bilateral distance for ij.29 As equation (21) shows, all else equal
theory predicts a smaller trade e¤ect of the international border dummy in absolute value
(i.e., less negative) for regions of larger economic size.
Figure 2 illustrates the individual coe¢ cients plotted against our proxy of internal
trade costs. As a more direct measure of economic size, Figure 3 plots the coe¢ cients
against logarithmic state GDP. Overall, the gures demonstrate a clear positive relation-
ship. As with the national border coe¢ cients, the individual estimates display a large
degree of heterogeneity, falling into a range of  2:7 to 0:9. The mean estimate is  0:64.30
27As exp( 4) = 0:02, all else equal in partial equilibrium the border reduces trade by 98 percent
relative to within-state trade. For general equilibrium e¤ects see section 4.7.
28The coe¢ cients for California, Illinois, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey and Virginia are positive and
signicant at the ve percent level. Despite these empirical outliers, in the theory the upper bound for
state-specic national border coe¢ cients is actually zero. In equation (7) tLii approaches t
S for n ! 1,
which is the same as tLn1;n2 through equation (10). Therefore, in equation (16) it follows k = 0 since
 = 1.
29Behrens, Ertur and Koch (2012) also estimate heterogeneous international border dummy coe¢ cients
based on a framework that allows for spatial correlation of trade ows.
30The corresponding common international border coe¢ cient that captures international trade ows
of U.S. states only is  0:60 and thus very close to the mean estimate underlying Figures 2 and 3. See
section 4.7 for details.
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The coe¢ cients are tightly estimated with an average standard error of 0:13. The larger
the state, the closer the individual international border coe¢ cient tends to be to zero.
For example, Wyoming as the smallest state is associated with an international border
coe¢ cient of  1:53, whereas the value for California as the largest state is  0:34. Under
the assumption of  = 5, the corresponding tari¤ equivalents would be 47 percent and 9
percent.
We stress that in our model, the international border barrier at the micro level, ,
is common across all regions (see equation 19). The substantial di¤erence between the
above tari¤ equivalents can therefore be attributed to spatial aggregation as a primary
driving force behind border e¤ect estimates.
4.5 Sample composition e¤ects
As shown above, border dummy coe¢ cients can vary substantially across regions. They
tend to be large in absolute magnitude for small states, and vice versa. It follows that
when we estimate common border e¤ects, our estimates should be sensitive to the distri-
bution of state economic size in the sample. We perform a simple check of this sample
composition e¤ect.
In order to systematically change the composition of economic size in our sample,
we run rolling regressions where we keep dropping states and their associated trade ows
from the sample. More specically, we start out with the domestic border e¤ect regression
as in column 1 of Table 1 for the year 1993 where we obtained a coe¢ cient on the national
border dummy of  1:47. We then drop the largest state from the sample in terms of GDP
(California) and re-estimate the border coe¢ cient. We then drop the second largest state
from the sample (New York) and re-estimate, and so on, such that the smallest states are
remaining. To obtain comparable estimates we keep the distance coe¢ cient at its initial
value but we allow the exporter and importer xed e¤ects to adjust freely. The black
dots in Figure 4 illustrate the national border coe¢ cients. As predicted by our theory, we
yield the following pattern: the more big states we drop from the sample, the larger the
coe¢ cients tend to become in absolute value. Although their movement is not strictly
monotonic, the downward trend is reasonably clear.
The grey diamonds in Figure 4 illustrate the coe¢ cients obtained when we drop the
smallest state rst (Wyoming), then the second smallest state (Vermont), and so on. As
expected, we yield the opposite pattern: the national border coe¢ cients move upwards
towards zero. Overall in Figure 4, we obtain coe¢ cients ranging from around  2 to  0:5.
In Figure 5, we repeat the rolling regressions for the international border e¤ect, start-
ing out with the same regression as in column 3 of Table 1 where the obtained a coe¢ cient
21
of  1:25. We nd the same pattern as in Figure 4. That is, the smaller the average eco-
nomic size of states in the sample, the further the estimated border e¤ect tends to get
pushed away from zero, and vice versa. The coe¢ cients roughly fall in the range from
 3:5 to 0.31
Therefore, in summary we nd strong sample composition e¤ects in Figures 4 and 5.
We interpret these as further evidence corroborating the impact of state size on border
e¤ects. The gures demonstrate that this impact is quantitatively strong.
4.6 Aggregating to U.S. Census divisions
The individual border e¤ects illustrated in Figures 1-3 demonstrate that larger states
tend to exhibit smaller border e¤ects in absolute magnitude. We now trace this relation-
ship between economic size and the magnitude of border e¤ects in a di¤erent way. We
aggregate U.S. states and thus enlarge the size of the underlying spatial units.
To be specic, we aggregate the 48 contiguous U.S. states into the nine Census divi-
sions as dened by the U.S. Census Bureau. We choose Census divisions because their
borders conveniently coincide with state borders (this would not be the case with Federal
Reserve Districts, for instance). But any alternative clustering of adjacent states would
in principle be equally suitable for this aggregation exercise. Figure 6 provides a map of
the Census divisions.
Trade ows within a division are taken to equal the sum of the internal trade ows
of its states plus the ows between these states. Trade ows between divisions are given
by the sum of trade ows between their respective states. Similarly, trade ows from
a division to a foreign country are given as the sum of exports from the states in the
division to the foreign country.
Table 2 reports regression results that correspond to Table 1. We use the simple aver-
age of distances associated with the underlying individual trade ows. The division-based
national border dummy coe¢ cients are  1:17 and  1:25 and thus smaller in magnitude
than the corresponding state-based estimates of  1:47 and  1:48 in Table 1, albeit not
statistically di¤erent. The division-based international border dummy coe¢ cients are
 0:36 and  0:39 and thus considerably smaller in magnitude and signicantly di¤er-
ent from the corresponding state-based estimates of  1:25 and  1:21 in Table 1. The
distance coe¢ cients are very similar between Tables 1 and 2.
Overall, a common pattern arises: the border coe¢ cients are further away from zero
31Balistreri and Hillberry (2007) show that the reduction of the border e¤ect by Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) relies on the addition of trade ows between U.S. states to the sample. Since U.S. states
are on average considerably larger than Canadian provinces, we expect the addition of such ows to push
the common border dummy estimate towards zero according to our result in Figure 5.
22
when states are the underlying spatial units, and the border coe¢ cients are closer to zero
when we use divisions as the larger underlying spatial units. This pattern mirrors the
cross-sectional heterogeneity apparent in the individual border coe¢ cients depicted in
Figures 1-3.
4.7 Multilateral resistance e¤ects in general equilibrium
In their seminal paper, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) highlight the role of general
equilibrium. They show that small and large countries react di¤erently to changes in
international border barriers. Intuitively, removing the border leads to a reallocation of
trade away from domestic towards international partners. But since a small country is
more exposed to international trade and thus more exposed to the border barrier, this
reallocation is relatively stronger for the small country.32 This di¤erential response be-
tween small and large countries is entirely driven by price index or multilateral resistance
e¤ects.
In our theoretical framework, however, multilateral resistance is symmetric across
countries (see appendix B.2). The di¤erential trade response is instead driven by het-
erogeneity in the border e¤ect itself due to spatial aggregation, as shown in equation
(21).
While multilateral resistance is the same across countries in our theory, we cannot
assume this to be the case with actual trade ows. In Table 3 we explore the general
equilibrium counterfactuals implied by removed international border barriers, accounting
for both heterogeneous border e¤ects as well as heterogeneous multilateral resistance
e¤ects. We use the same balanced sample as for column 4 of Table 1 based on 24,996
observations for the years 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2007 (6,249 observations per year).
In panel 1 we report counterfactuals based on removing a common international border
barrier as in the standard Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) model. As in column
4 of Table 1, we estimate this border barrier based on the logarithmic version of the
standard gravity equation (1) with logarithmic bilateral distance and country xed e¤ects
as additional controls. The border dummy captures the U.S. international border only.33
We then remove the U.S. international border and recompute the associated general
32To be precise, the ratio of bilateral international trade to bilateral domestic trade increases more
strongly for a country consisting of smaller regions such as Canada. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003,
section IV.C) discuss the relatively small size of the Canadian economy in the context of their data
set of trade ows between Canadian provinces and U.S. states.
33The distance and border dummy coe¢ cients are 1:21 and 0:60, respectively, both highly signicant
at the 1 percent level. As the border dummy only captures the U.S. border, its coe¢ cient is directly
comparable to the individual border coe¢ cients for U.S. states plotted in Figures 2 and 3. Their average
is  0:64 and thus about the same.
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equilibrium.34
Panel 1 presents the logarithmic di¤erences between the counterfactual and initial
equilibria. Removing the U.S. border leads to an increase in bilateral trade ows by
23 percent on average (see the top row of panel 1). Trade would have increased by 31
percent just through the direct (partial equilibrium) e¤ect of reducing bilateral trade
costs.35 This direct e¤ect is the same for all U.S. states by construction because we
impose a common border barrier. The o¤setting general equilibrium e¤ect through falling
multilateral resistance is 10 percent on average but varies somewhat across states, while
the increase in incomes pushes up trade by 2 percent. In sum, there is a modest degree of
variation across states due to the heterogeneous general equilibrium e¤ects. For instance,
the bilateral trade of California goes up by 24 percent on average, whereas the trade of
Wyoming goes up by 21 percent.
In panel 2 we report counterfactuals based on our framework with heterogeneous
border barriers. We estimate state-specic border coe¢ cients as described in section
4.4.2. Those are plotted in Figures 2 and 3. We also account for multilateral resistance
e¤ects when computing the counterfactual equilibrium. Removing the heterogeneous
border barriers leads to average e¤ects that are almost identical (see the top row of panel
2). However, the underlying e¤ects for individual states exhibit much more variation.
The key insight is that this variation is primarily driven by the heterogeneous direct
e¤ects (see column 2b), not multilateral resistance e¤ects. The overall di¤erences across
states can be quite substantial. For instance, here the bilateral trade of California goes
up by 13 percent on average, whereas the trade of Wyoming goes up over four times as
much (61 percent). Consistent with our theory, small states are more a¤ected by the
removal of the border.36
Overall, we conclude that heterogeneous border barriers translate into heterogeneous
trade e¤ects. Quantitatively, this form of heterogeneity is considerably more important
than heterogeneity associated with multilateral resistance e¤ects.
34For the initial equilibrium we take the income data for the 48 U.S. states and 50 large foreign
countries in our sample for the year 1993, thus capturing the vast majority of global economic activity.
Using our estimated distance and border dummy coe¢ cients, we use numerical methods to compute
the multilateral resistance variables and construct the associated bilateral trade ows based on gravity
equation (1). For the counterfactual we set the border dummy coe¢ cient to zero and recompute the full
equilibrium, assuming that the endowment quantities are xed.
35Assuming  = 5 this corresponds to a cut in trade costs by 7.75 percent since 0:31=(1 ) =  0:0775.
36For some states the overall trade e¤ect shows up as slightly negative (e.g.,  7 percent for Connecti-
cut). This happens because some individual border coe¢ cients were estimated to have a positive sign
(see Figures 2 and 3). Most of these positive coe¢ cients are not signicant, but we report the associated
results in Table 3 nevertheless.
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5 Discussion
The aim of much of the empirical literature on border e¤ects is to identify  (for the
national border e¤ect) and  (for the international border e¤ect). However, as we have
shown in the context of equations (16) and (22), these parameters cannot be identied
empirically in gravity regressions based on aggregate data. This is similar in spirit to
the result by Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2009) based on price data who show that border
e¤ects cannot be identied by comparing price dispersion across countries.
For the national border e¤ect, there is no domestic border friction to begin with
because tS is a bilateral friction that appears between any two micro regions, regardless
of whether they happen to be in the same state or not. In that sense, the domestic border
e¤ect is a pure statistical artefact.
For the international border e¤ect, there is a friction of crossing an international
border as long as we have  < 0. But to the extent that it exists, this friction cannot
be identied from traditional gravity estimation.37 Equation (21) shows how  could be
recovered once  1i and 
 1
j have been constructed. But from equation (18) it is clear
that  1i and 
 1
j will depend on the choice of spatial unit for a micro region and thus
parameters such as the distance friction . They will also depend on the choice for the
underlying topography (be it a circle or an alternative spatial structure).
Overall, the insight is that a trade cost function with a border dummy can mechani-
cally lead to large estimated border e¤ects depending on the choice of spatial unit even
if individual economic agents at the micro level do not face any border friction. Due to
spatial aggregation, the border e¤ects estimated with aggregate data systematically vary
by country characteristics, in particular economic size. In that light, traditional border
e¤ects could be seen as statistical artefacts in the sense that their variation is not driven
by underlying border frictions at the micro level faced by individual economic agents.
6 Conclusion
We build a model of spatial aggregation. Initially symmetric micro regions are aggregated
to larger macro regions. Our theory shows how spatial aggregation a¤ects the internal
and bilateral trade costs of aggregated regions, and in turn their estimated border e¤ects.
The main result of the theory is that aggregation leads to border e¤ect heterogeneity in
that larger regions or countries are associated with border e¤ects closer to zero, and vice
37If  = 0, the international border friction does not exist. But as equation (21) demonstrates,
estimation based on aggregate would data would still yield heterogeneous coe¢ cients. Those would be
positive.
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versa. The intuition is that due to spatial frictions, aggregation across space increases
the relative trade costs of trading within as opposed to across borders.
We collect a data set of U.S. exports that combines three types of trade ows: trade
within an individual state (Minnesota-Minnesota), trade between U.S. states (Minnesota-
Texas) as well as trade ows from an individual U.S. state to a foreign country (Minnesota-
France). This data set allows us to estimate the e¤ect on trade of crossing the domestic
state border and the e¤ect of crossing the U.S. international border. Moreover, it allows
us to estimate these e¤ects individually by state.
We nd that the larger the state, the smaller its international border e¤ect and the
smaller its domestic border e¤ect. In addition, both border e¤ects decline in magnitude
when states are aggregated into larger U.S. Census divisions. We also nd substantial
sample composition e¤ects when small and large states are systematically dropped from
the sample.
Overall, we conclude that border e¤ects are inherently heterogeneous. This underly-
ing heterogeneity drives the magnitude of standard, common border dummy coe¢ cients
estimated in the literature. To the extent that there exist frictions of crossing domes-
tic or international borders at the micro level of rms and households, standard gravity
estimation based on aggregate trade ows is unable to recover them. We surmise that
structural estimation or natural experiments involving micro data may be the way forward
to achieve that objective.
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Appendix A: The domestic border e¤ect
This appendix contains a number of derivations referred to in the main text.
A.1 Aggregation and multilateral resistance
We exploit our symmetric setting to characterize the multilateral resistance price indices.
As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the general equilibrium price index for each
micro region is given by  
P Si
1 
=
RX
j=1
ySj
yW
 
tSji
P Sj
!1 
;
where R is the number of micro regions. Due to symmetry we have tSji = t
S
ij = t
S for all
j 6= i as well as ySj =yW = 1=R and P Sj = P S, and therefore
 
P S
1 
=
1
R

tSii
P S
1 
+
R  1
R

tS
P S
1 
; (23)
where the rst term reects the internal part, and the second term captures the relation-
ships with all other micro regions. We can solve for P S as
 
P S
1 
=

1
R
 
tSii
1 
+
R  1
R
 
tS
1  12
(24)
so that the price index is pinned down by the number of micro regions and their trade
costs.
Now suppose n micro regions are aggregated into a macro region. Analogous to (23),
we can then write the micro price index from the perspective of a remaining micro region
as  
P S
1 
=
1
R

tSii
P S
1 
+
R  1  n
R

tS
P S
1 
+
n
R

tS
PL
1 
; (25)
where the rst term reects the internal part. The second term captures the remaining
R 1 n micro regions. The third term captures the relationship with the macro region,
weighted by its share n=R of the global economy. The macro price index PL appears
here.
From gravity equation (5) at the macro level, we can solve for the macro price index
as  
PL
1 
=

yLi y
L
i
xLiiy
W
 
tLii
1  12
:
We use (6) to replace xLii as well as y
L
i = ny
S
i to obtain
 
PL
1 
=
 
P S
1   tLii1 
1
n
(tSii)
1 
+ n 1
n
(tS)1 
! 1
2
:
For brevity, we set
1  
  
tLii
1 
1
n
(tSii)
1 
+ n 1
n
(tS)1 
! 1
2
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so that we have  
PL
1 
=
 
P S
1 
: (26)
We insert this result back into expression (25) and solve for the micro price index as
 
P S
1 
=
 
1
R
 
tSii
1 
+
R  1  n
R
 
tS
1 
+
n
R

tS

1 ! 12
:
Setting this result equal to expression (24), we obtain
1
R
 
tSii
1 
+
R  1
R
 
tS
1 
=
1
R
 
tSii
1 
+
R  1  n
R
 
tS
1 
+
n
R

tS

1 
;
which implies 1  = 1. Inserting this into (26), we arrive at the result that the price
index is una¤ected by the aggregation of symmetric regions, i.e., PL = P S. Note that
1  = 1 also implies the expression in equation (7) for domestic trade costs in the macro
region.
A.2 Estimating the border e¤ect
As expressed in equation (12), the coe¢ cient estimate for  is given by
b = Cov

ln

xij
yiyj

; NATij

Var (NATij)
:
Our aim is to derive an analytical solution for this expression. Since xij= (yiyj) and t1 ij
are proportional, it can be rewritten as
b = Cov  ln  t1 ij  ; NATij
Var (NATij)
: (27)
We assume a sample with K internal trade observations with NATij = 0 and M other
observations with NATij = 1 such that we have K +M total observations. To simplify
notation let Aij = NATij. Then the denominator is
Var (NATij) =
1
K +M
X
ij
 
Aij   A
  
Aij   A

=
1
K +M
24 X
ij;NATij=0
  A2 + X
ij;NATij=1
 
1  A2
35 ;
where the rst term in the brackets reects the K internal observations. Using A =
M= (K +M) for the average of the Aijs we then obtain the solution
Var (NATij) =
KM
(K +M)2
:
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Setting Bij = ln
 
t1 ij

, we can write the numerator of (27) as
Cov
 
ln
 
t1 ij

; NATij

=
1
K +M
X
ij
 
Bij  B
  
Aij   A

=
1
K +M
24 KX
i=1;NATij=0
 
ln
 
t1 ii
 B   A+ X
ij;NATij=1
 
  B  1  A
35 ;
where the rst term in the brackets reects the K internal observations. Using
B = A+
1
K +M
KX
k=1
ln
 
t1 kk

we can rewrite the expression as
Cov
 
ln
 
t1 ij

; NATij

=  Var (NATij) +
1
K +M
24 PKi=1;NATij=0 ln  t1 ii   1K+M PKk=1 ln  t1 kk    A
+
P
ij;NATij=1

  1
K+M
PK
k=1 ln
 
t1 kk
  
1  A
35
=  Var (NATij) +
1
K +M
"
 

M
K +M
2 KX
k=1
ln
 
t1 kk
  KM
(K +M)2
KX
k=1
ln
 
t1 kk
#
=  Var (NATij) +
KM
(K +M)2
ln
 
KY
k=1
 
t 1kk
 1
K
!
;
where the last term in parentheses is the geometric average of internal trade costs in the
sample. Inserting this result into (27) we obtain
b =  + ln KY
k=1
 
t 1kk
 1
K
!
:
Let us consider a sample that is balancedin the sense that no internal or bilateral
observations are missing. We have N2 total observations with K = N internal and M =
N(N   1) bilateral ows. We then get the result in equation (13).
A.3 Invariance of the border e¤ect to normalization
A key feature of the generalized trade cost function (14) introduced in section 3.1.3 is
that its implied border e¤ect (15) is invariant to the specic normalization chosen for
trade costs. For instance, suppose we choose the new normalization tkl = 1 for trade
costs between regions k and l. This normalization implies that trade costs t1 ij for all i; j
get multiplied by a constant q  1=t1 kl > 0 such that
ln
 
t1 ij q

= NATij +  (1 NATij) ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2 + ln(q)
= NATij +  (1 NATij) ln
  
t1 ii q
  
t1 jj q
 1
2 + (1   (1 NATij)) ln(q):
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The border e¤ect follows as
d ln (xij)
dNATij
=     ln   t1 ii q  t1 jj q 12 +  ln(q)
=     ln  t1 ii t1 jj  12 ;
where the latter equation gives the same result as in (15). Note that the traditional trade
cost function (11) is also invariant to renormalization since
ln
 
t1 ij q

= NATij + ln(q)
such that
d ln (xij)
dNATij
= 
irrespective of q.
A.4 The bias of omitting internal trade costs
We show that ignoring the interaction term between the border dummy and internal
trade costs leads to omitted variable bias unless internal trade costs are zero on average.
The proof is as follows.
The heterogeneous trade cost function (14) can be expanded as
ln
 
t1 ij

= NATij +  ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2    NATij ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2 :
The last term,  NATij ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
1=2
, introduces an interaction between the domestic
border dummy NATij and internal trade costs that vary across regions.
Imagine a researcher imposes the traditional trade cost function (11), thus omitting
the interaction term. The  domestic border coe¢ cient in the traditional function is then
unbiased only in the special case of a zero covariance between the border dummy and the
interaction term. Formally, we can state this condition as
Cov

NATij; NATij ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2

= 0: (28)
To simplify notation let
Aij = NATij;
Bij = NATij ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2 :
so that condition (28) becomes
Cov (Aij; Bij) = 0
,
X
ij
 
Aij   A
  
Bij  B

= 0;
where A and B denote the arithmetic averages of Aij and Bij.
Assume a sample with K internal trade observations with NATij = 0 as well as M
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other observations with NATij = 1 such that we have K+M total observations. We can
rewrite the previous equation as
K
  A   B+ X
ij;NATij=1
 
1  A  Bij  B = 0
, KAB +  1  A X
ij;NATij=1
 
Bij  B

= 0;
where the rst term reects the K internal observations. We can rearrange the last
equation as
KAB    1  AMB +  1  A X
ij;NATij=1
Bij = 0
, (K +M)AB  MB +  1  A X
ij;NATij=1
Bij = 0:
Note that A =M= (K +M). The last equation thus simplies to 
1  A X
ij;NATij=1
Bij = 0
,
X
ij;NATij=1
ln
 
t1 ii t
1 
jj
 1
2 = 0
,
X
ij;NATij=1
[ln (tii) + ln (tjj)] = 0:
There are two partner regions (one exporter i and one exporter j) for each of theM non-
internal observations. Let mi denote the relative frequency with which region i appears
as a partner in those observations (either as an exporter or as an importer). Then we
can rewrite the last expression as
NX
i=1
mi ln (tii) = 0
,
NY
i=1
tmiii = 1;
where N is the number of regions in the sample. That is, the geometric average of internal
trade cost factors, weighted by the frequency of appearance in bilateral observations, is
equal to 1.
In a balanced sample with no missing internal or bilateral observations, we have
N2 total observations with K = N internal and M = N(N   1) bilateral ows. The
frequency of observations per region is therefore uniform with mi = 1=N 8i. As a special
case, we then have
NY
i=1
t
1
N
ii = 1:
That is, the unweighted geometric average of internal trade cost factors is equal to 1.
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A.5 A trade cost function with distance
In section 3.1 we use a model without spatial distance frictions. As a result, the trade
cost function (11) only contains a dummy variable for national trade ows.
In this appendix, we generalize the trade cost function to the more conventional
and realistic case that includes distance. In particular, we abandon the assumption
that all bilateral trade costs at the micro level are the same. Instead, in addition to
a domestic border dummy NATij, we introduce a distance friction 
h as in the model
for the international border e¤ect. To preserve symmetry, we model the economy as a
circle as in section 3.2. But since we focus on the domestic border e¤ect, we only need
to consider one country and can ignore all international ows. We therefore have the
following trade cost function at the micro level:
ln
 
tSh
1 
= NATh + ln
 
h
1 
;
where as in section 3.2 h denotes the number of steps between micro regions, with adjacent
regions one step (h = 1) apart and so on. We haveNATh = 1 for all bilateral ows (h  1)
and NATh = 0 for internal ows (h = 0).
Given the above micro structure of trade costs, bilateral trade costs between two
aggregated regions at the macro level follow from equations (17) and (18) as 
tLn1;n2;h
1 
= exp (NATh)
 
h
1 
(n1)
1  (n2)
1  :
For internal trade costs of a macro region m of aggregated size n we have from equation
(32)
 
tLmm
1 
=
1
n
 
tSii
1 
+ 2
n 1X
h=1
n  h
n2
 
tSh
1 
=
1
n
 
tSii
1 
+ exp (NATh) 2
n 1X
h=1
n  h
n2
 
h
1 
| {z }
(mm)
1 
; (29)
where we dene the last term as the internal distance friction mm, scaled by (1  ),
since it represents the appropriately weighted underlying frictions h within region m. It
is multiplied by the term exp (NATh) with h  1.
Assuming the distance relationship
 
h
1 
= disth, we obtain bilateral trade costs
ln
 
tLn1;n2;h
1 
= NATh +  ln (disth) + ln (n1)
1  + ln (n2)
1  :
For internal trade costs, ln
 
tLmm
1 
cannot be written as a log-linear function of NATh
and distmm because expression (29) is not multiplicative.
Overall, to combine bilateral and domestic trade costs we set up a heterogeneous trade
cost function similar to (14)
ln
 
t1 ij

= NATij+ ln (distij)+ln (i)
1 +ln (j)
1 +(1 NATij) ln (ij)
1 
2 : (30)
Trade cost function (30) captures bilateral trade costs when NATij = 1 for i 6= j and
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internal trade costs when NATij = 0 for i = j with
ln (i)
1  =   ln (distii)  ln (i)(1 )2 + ln (tii)1 
and where we now use i and j to denote the exporter and importer. Crucially, this
trade cost function features an interaction e¤ect as in equation (14). It can be estimated
as outlined in section 3.1.4 and equation (16). That is, exporter and importer xed
e¤ects are used in combination with region-specic domestic border dummies. The only
di¤erence is the addition of the standard bilateral distance regressor.
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Appendix B: The international border e¤ect
This appendix contains a number of derivations referred to in the main text.
B.1 Aggregate internal trade costs
We impose gravity at the macro level so that relationship (5) holds for the internal trade
of the macro region xLmm, where m denotes the set of n aggregated micro regions. This
internal macro ow consists of the n internal ows of the original micro regions and their
n(n  1) bilateral ows:
xLmm =
X
im
xSii +
X
im
X
jm;j 6=i
xSij
=
X
im
xSii + 2
n 1X
h=1
(n  h)xSh ;
where the second term on the right-hand side captures all bilateral micro ows and xSh
denotes trade between micro regions that are h steps apart.
Combining the corresponding gravity relationships at the macro and micro levels, we
obtain an expression similar to equation (6)
nySnyS
yW

tLmm
PLPL
1 
| {z }
xLmm
=
X
im
ySyS
yW

tSii
P SP S
1 
| {z }
xSii
+ 2
n 1X
h=1
(n  h)y
SyS
yW

tSh
P SP S
1 
| {z }
xSh
: (31)
Given that multilateral resistance is una¤ected by aggregation, the internal trade costs
of the macro region therefore follow from equation (31) as
 
tLmm
1 
=
1
n
 
tSii
1 
+ 2
n 1X
h=1
n  h
n2
 
tSh
1 
: (32)
If bilateral costs are higher than internal costs at the micro level (tSh > t
S
ii), then internal
trade costs at the macro level grow in the number of aggregated micro regions (@tLmm=@n >
0). The only exception is the limiting case of no spatial frictions in the sense of tSh = t
S
ii.
In that case, internal trade costs at the macro level are the same as micro-level costs
(tLmm = t
S
h = t
S
ii).
B.2 Aggregation and multilateral resistance
It is also the case for the model of the international border e¤ect that aggregation leaves
the multilateral resistance price indices una¤ected. The proof is as follows.
As in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the general equilibrium price index for each
micro region is given by  
P Si
1 
=
2RX
j=1
ySj
yW
 
tSji
P Sj
!1 
;
where R is the number of Home micro regions and R = R is the number of Foreign
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micro regions. Thus, the price index aggregates trade costs over R + R = 2R micro
regions. The bilateral trade cost term tSji refers to t
S
h for trade with other micro regions
in the same country that are h steps away, and to tSint for trade with micro regions in the
other country. Due to symmetry we have ySj =y
W = 1=(2R) and P Sj = P
S. Therefore we
can write the price index for a Home region as
 
P S
1 
=
1
2R

tSii
P S
1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSji
P S
!1 
+
1
2

tSint
P S
1 
; (33)
where the rst term reects the trade of the micro region with itself, the second term
captures the relationships with all other Home micro regions, and the third term captures
the relationships with all Foreign micro regions. We can solve for P S as
 
P S
1 
=
 
1
2R
 
tSii
1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSji
1 
+
1
2
 
tSint
1 ! 12
(34)
so that the price index is pinned down by the number of micro regions and their trade
costs. The analogous steps apply for the price index of a Foreign micro region.
Now suppose n micro regions in the Home country are aggregated into a macro region
denoted by the subscript m. Analogous to (33), we can then write the micro price index
from the perspective of a remaining Home micro region as
 
P S
1 
=
1
2R

tSii
P S
1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=i;m
 
tSji
P S
!1 
+
n
2R

tLmi
PL
1 
+
1
2

tSint
P S
1 
; (35)
where the rst term reects the internal part. The second term captures the remaining
Home micro regions. The third term captures the relationship with the macro region,
weighted by its share n=(2R) of the global economy. The macro price index PL appears
here together with the bilateral trade costs tLmi between the macro region and the micro
region. The fourth term captures the international relationships.
From gravity equation (5) at the macro level, we can solve for the macro price index
as  
PL
1 
=

yLmy
L
m
xLmmy
W
 
tLmm
1  12
:
We use (31) to replace xLmm as well as y
L
m = ny
S
m to obtain
 
PL
1 
=
 
P S
1   tLmm1 
1
n
(tSii)
1 
+ 2
n2
Pn 1
h=1(n  h) (tSh)1 
! 1
2
:
For brevity, we set
1  
  
tLmm
1 
1
n
(tSii)
1 
+ 2
n2
Pn 1
h=1(n  h) (tSh)1 
! 1
2
(36)
so that we have  
PL
1 
=
 
P S
1 
: (37)
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We insert this result back into expression (35) and solve for the micro price index as
 
P S
1 
=
 
1
2R
 
tSii
1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=i;m
 
tSji
1 
+
n
2R

tLmi

1 
+
1
2
 
tSint
1 ! 12
: (38)
Setting this result equal to expression (34), we obtain
n

tLmi

1 
+
X
jR;j 6=i;m
 
tSji
1 
=
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSji
1 
:
The tSji terms between i and those micro regions j that were not aggregated are the same
on both sides of the equation. We therefore have
n

tLmi

1 
=
X
jm
 
tSji
1 
; (39)
where the right-hand side only sums over those micro regions j that were aggregated.
In equation (35) we write down the post-aggregation price index of a micro region.
Analogously, the post-aggregation price index for the macro region in the Home country
is given by
 
PL
1 
=
n
2R

tLmm
PL
1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=m
 
tLjm
P S
!1 
+
1
2

tSint
P S
1 
;
where the rst term reects trade within the macro region. The second term captures the
relationships with the remaining micro regions. The third term captures the international
relationships, where we use the result surrounding equation (19) that international trade
costs are una¤ected by aggregation and thus equal to tSint.
We then substitute the relationship (37) and solve for the micro price index as
 
P S
1 
=

1
1 
 1
2
 
n
2R

tLmm

1 
+
1
2R
X
jR;j 6=m
 
tLjm
1 
+
1
2
 
tSint
1 ! 12
:
We set this result equal to equation (38). To replace the
 
tLmm
1 
term, we use the
denition of  in equation (36). To replace the
 
tLmi=
1 
term in equation (38), we use
the result in (39). We also note that due to symmetry, we have
 
tLjm
1 
=
 
tLmj
1 
.
Through equation (39) this is the same as
 
tLjm
1 
=
 
tLmj
1 
=
1 
n
X
im
 
tSij
1 
:
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Collecting terms and simplifying, we obtain
 
tSii
1 
+
2
n
n 1X
h=1
(n  h)  tSh1  + 1n X
jR;j 6=m
X
im
 
tSij
1 
+
1
1 
R
 
tSint
1 
=
 
tSii
1 
+
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSji
1 
+R
 
tSint
1 
:
We note that the second term on the left-hand side of the last equation captures all
bilateral trade costs amongst the micro regions that were aggregated. We can write this
as
2
n
n 1X
h=1
(n  h)  tSh1  = 1nX
jm
X
im;i 6=j
 
tSij
1 
:
We also note that
1
n
X
jR;j 6=m
X
im
 
tSij
1 
+
1
n
X
jm
X
im;i 6=j
 
tSij
1 
=
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSij
1 
=
X
jR;j 6=i
 
tSji
1 
so that ultimately, after dropping equal terms on both sides of the equation, we obtain
1
1 
R
 
tSint
1 
= R
 
tSint
1 
:
This implies 1  = 1. Through equation (37) we therefore arrive at the result that the
price index is una¤ected by aggregation, i.e., PL = P S.
B.3 The bias of omitting the interaction term
The trade cost function (20) includes an interaction term that combines the international
border dummy with region-specic i and j variables. We can rewrite this trade cost
function as
ln
 
t1 ij

= INTij + ln
 
1 ij

+ ln(ij)
1    INTij ln(ij)1 :
Imagine a researcher imposes the traditional trade cost function without the inter-
action term. The  international border coe¢ cient in the traditional function is then
unbiased only in the special case of a zero covariance between the border dummy and the
interaction term. Formally, we can state this condition as
Cov
 
INTij; INTij ln (ij)
1  = 0: (40)
To simplify notation let
Aij = INTij;
Bij = INTij ln (ij)
1  :
40
so that condition (40) becomes
Cov (Aij; Bij) = 0
,
X
ij
 
Aij   A
  
Bij  B

= 0;
where A and B denote the arithmetic averages of Aij and Bij.
Assume a sample with K national trade observations for which INTij = 0 and M in-
ternational observations for which INTij = 1 such that we haveK+M total observations.
We can rewrite the previous equation as
K
  A   B+ X
ij;INTij=1
 
1  A  Bij  B = 0
, KAB +  1  A X
ij;INTij=1
 
Bij  B

= 0
where the rst term reects the K national observations. We can rearrange the last
equation as
KAB    1  AMB +  1  A X
ij;INTij=1
Bij = 0
, (K +M)AB  MB +  1  A X
ij;INTij=1
Bij = 0:
Note that A =M= (K +M). The last equation thus simplies to 
1  A X
ij;INTij=1
Bij = 0
,
X
ij;INTij=1
ln (ij)
1  = 0
,
X
ij;INTij=1
[ln (i) + ln (j)] = 0:
There are two partner regions (one exporter i and one exporter j) for each of the M
international observations. Let mi denote the relative frequency with which region i
appears as a partner in those observations (either as an exporter or as an importer).
Then we can rewrite the last expression as
NX
i=1
mi ln (i) = 0
,
NY
i=1
mii = 1;
where N is the number of regions in the sample. That is, the geometric average of the
region-specic i terms, weighted by the frequency in bilateral observations, is equal to
1. Given that i  1, it must be that i = 1 holds for all i. This condition can only hold
if region i is a micro region (ni = 1) or if there are no spatial frictions ( = 1).
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Appendix C: Data
This appendix describes our data sources in detail.
C.1 Domestic exports: Commodity Flow Survey
For our measures of the shipments of goods within and across U.S. states, we use aggregate
trade data from the Commodity Flow Survey, which is a joint e¤ort of the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics and the Census Bureau. We use survey results from 1993,
1997, 2002, and 2007. The survey covers the origin and destination of shipments of
manufacturing, mining, wholesale trade, and selected retail establishments. The survey
excludes shipments in the following sectors: services, crude petroleum and natural gas
extraction, farm, forestry, shery, construction, government, and most retail. Shipments
from foreign establishments are also excluded; import shipments are excluded until they
reach a domestic shipper. U.S. export (i.e., trans-border) shipments are also excluded.38
C.2 International exports from U.S. states: Origin of Move-
ment
Our data on exports by U.S. states to foreign destinations are from the Origin of Move-
ment series.39 These data are compiled by the Foreign Trade Division of the U.S. Census
Bureau. The data in this series identify the state from which an export begins its journey
to a foreign country. However, we would like to know the state in which the export was
produced. Below we provide details on the Origin of Movement series and its suitability
as a measure of the origin of production.40
Beginning in 1987, the Origin of Movement series provides the current-year export
sales, or free-alongside-ship (f.a.s.) costs if not sold, for 54 statesto 242 foreign desti-
nations. These export sales are for merchandise sales only and do not include services
exports. The 54 statesinclude the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and unknown. Following Wolf (2000), we use the 48 contiguous
U.S. states. Rather than all 242 destinations, we use the 50 leading export destinations
for U.S. exports for 2005.41 We use the annual data from 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2007 for
total merchandise exports.42
38Erlbaum and Holguin-Veras (2006) note that sample size has been a major issue. The 1993 survey
collected data from 200,000 establishments and the size was subsequently reduced to 100,000 in 1997
and 50,000 in 2002. In response to complaints from the freight data users community, the sample size
was increased to 100,000 in 2007.
39Other studies that have used the Origin of Movement series include Smith (1999), Coughlin and
Wall (2003) and Coughlin (2004).
40The highlighted details as well as much additional information can be found in Cassey (2009).
41In alphabetical order, these countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, and Venezuela.
42We have also tried the data for manufacturing only (as opposed to total merchandise). The two series
are very highly correlated (99 percent). The regression results are almost identical and we therefore do
not report them.
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Concerns about using the Origin of Movement series to identify the location of pro-
duction are especially pertinent for agricultural and mining exports. We, however, focus
on manufactured goods. Cassey (2009) has examined the issue of the coincidence of the
state origin of movement and the state of production for manufactured goods.43 The rea-
son for restricting the focus to manufacturing is that the best source for location-based
data on export production, Exports from Manufacturing Establishments,covers only
manufacturing.44
Casseys key nding relevant to our analysis is that, overall, the Origin of Move-
ment data is of su¢ cient quality to be used as the origin of the production of exports.
Nonetheless, the data for specic states may not be of su¢ cient quality as the origin of
production. These states are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, New Mexico,
South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming. He recommends the removal of Alaska
and Hawaii in particular. As we use the 48 contiguous U.S. states, our data set is consis-
tent with this recommendation.
C.3 Adjustments to the state trade data
Our simultaneous use of the intra-state and inter-state shipments data from the Commod-
ity Flow Survey and the merchandise international trade data from the Origin of Move-
ment series requires an adjustment to increase the comparability of these data sets. Such
an adjustment arises because of three important di¤erences between the data sources.
First, the merchandise international trade data measures a shipment from the source to
the port of exit just once, whereas the commodity ow data likely measures a good in a
shipment more than once. For example, a good may be shipped from a plant to a ware-
house and, later, to a retailer. Second, goods destined for foreign countries, when they
are shipped to a port of exit, are included in domestic shipments. Third, the coverage
of sectors di¤ers between the data sources. The Commodity Flow Survey includes ship-
ments of manufactured goods, but it excludes agriculture and part of mining. Meanwhile,
the merchandise trade data includes all goods.
Identical to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), we scale down the data in the Com-
modity Flow Survey by the ratio of total domestic merchandise trade to total domestic
shipments from the Commodity Flow Survey. Total domestic merchandise trade is ap-
proximated by gross output in the goods-producing sectors (i.e., agriculture, mining, and
manufacturing) minus international merchandise exports.45 This calculation yields ad-
justment factors of 0.495 for 1993, 0.508 for 1997, 0.430 for 2002, and 0.405 for 2007.46
Similar to Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and as discussed by Balistreri and Hillberry
(2007), our adjustment to the commodity ow data does not solve all the measurement
problems, but it is the best feasible option.
43For the initial work on this issue, see Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1991) and Cronovich and Gazel
(1999). As Casseys (2009) analysis refers to manufactured goods, we note that we have also tried
the Origin of Movement manufacturing data (as opposed to total merchandise) with virtually identical
results.
44The data in the Exports from Manufacturing Establishments is available at
http://www.census.gov/mcd/exports/ but does not contain destination information, so it cannot
be used for the current research project.
45See Helliwell (1997, 1998) and Wei (1996).
46The di¤erence between our adjustment factor for 1993 and that of Anderson and van Wincoop, 0.495
vs. 0.517, is due to data revision.
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C.4 Other data
The rest of the data used in our empirical work can be characterized as well-known. We
take export data between the 50 foreign countries in our sample from the IMF Direction
of Trade Statistics. For individual U.S. states we use state gross domestic product data
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. For foreign countries, we use data on gross
domestic product taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database (October 2007
edition).
We use the standard great circle distance formula to measure inter-state and interna-
tional distances between capital cities in kilometers. As intra-state distance, we use the
distance between the two largest cities in a state.
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